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In the 1980s scholars in the ªelds of history and political science rediscovered the
work of Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian philosopher of war. This renewed interest
sparked a brief revival of the study of war and strategy (the latter of which encom-
passes efforts to exploit war’s dialectic to achieve military and political victory). After
relying for decades on operations research to minimize the likelihood of nuclear war
by bolstering deterrence—an approach that largely eliminated the need for traditional
strategy—scholars began to resurrect, apply, and sometimes misapply Clausewitz’s
writings. Originally published in 1987, Edward Luttwak’s Strategy: The Logic of War
and Peace was probably the best work of the Clausewitzian revival because it offered a
clear summary of the great philosopher’s insights into war’s dialectic. In the process,
Luttwak articulated a concise theory of war. Despite what Les Aspin had to say about
the original edition of Strategy (“Luttwak presents a new universal theory of strategy”),
there is little new in either the original or the revised version. Nevertheless, the book
constitutes an outstanding achievement: Luttwak has written what amounts to a
“Cliff Notes” for one of the most difªcult and misunderstood volumes of all time,
Clausewitz’s On War.
Luttwak’s careful analysis is important because observers and practitioners alike
often do not think about war as a dialectic. They fail to base their plans and policies
on the fact that outcomes in war cannot be determined unilaterally and are instead
produced by the interaction of both (or all) parties to a conºict. They also fail to real-
ize that in every conºict there is a culminating point of victory, to borrow a phrase
from the Prussian philosopher, in which successful policies begin to lay the ground-
work for failure or even disaster. For example, a victorious army that marches too far
into the territory of a “defeated” enemy might soon ªnd itself at the end of a precari-
ous supply line, facing opponents now willing to ªght tenaciously to defend their
homeland. War’s dialectic also defeats linear strategies that produce “peacetime”
efªciencies. It might seem cost-effective, for instance, to concentrate the U.S. ºeet in
only three major ports, but in wartime this efªciency would prove to be false because
the enemy would need to attack only three bases to cripple the U.S. ºeet. Similarly, al-
though a direct route to one’s destination is best in peacetime, an indirect ap-
proach—across mountainous or swampy terrain rather than along a defended high-
way—might be preferable in wartime.
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Luttwak describes how this dialectic shapes the inºuence of technology on war
and on tactical, operational, and theater strategy, and he explains how these levels in-
teract to govern the outcome of conºict. Applying Luttwak’s logic of war and peace
can yield results that many will ªnd disturbing. He stresses the need to separate the
good intentions of actors from the results of their initiatives. In recent years humani-
tarian operations, peacekeeping, international intervention in ethnic conºicts, and
long-term aid to refugees have been depicted as constructive ways to end needless
bloodshed and destruction. Luttwak criticizes peacekeeping as misguided because it
“prevents the transformation of war into peace” by eliminating incentives for the an-
tagonists to negotiate a resolution to their dispute. Luttwak also applies this logic to
refute warriors’ hopes and assumptions. Airpower enthusiasts will ªnd unsettling his
assertion that the bombing of Nazi Germany’s industry helped to stimulate German
war production. Destroying homes and existing plants created large numbers of un-
employed workers who were willing to accept work in war industries.
Although the logic advanced in Strategy is compelling, it is often so difªcult to
apply in practice that even Luttwak at times falters in his analysis. Whenever one pos-
its a persistent status quo or projects current trends into the future, one ignores war’s
dialectic. For instance, Luttwak seems to suggest that the West’s aversion to casualties
will continue indeªnitely to shape the conduct of war. But the U.S. response in Af-
ghanistan after September 2001 suggests that Americans are indeed willing to suffer
casualties, especially when a threat arises to the U.S. homeland itself. At other times
Luttwak’s analysis is inconsistent, a weakness that is largely attributable to profound
changes that have occurred since he wrote the original edition of his book. Airpower
has come of age since 1987, even though Luttwak highlights the inability of aircraft to
locate and destroy mobile Scud missiles during the 1991 Gulf War or to do much
damage to well-camouºaged armored vehicles during the air war over Kosovo. Even
so, movement on the battleªeld in the face of U.S. airpower is suicidal, as evidenced
by the fates of the Iraqi attack on Khafji during the 1991 Gulf War and the jihadis in
the hills of Afghanistan in 2001. Luttwak goes astray by trying to support an old judg-
ment about the effectiveness of airpower when in fact his main point is more impor-
tant. Opponents eventually will ªnd a way to counter the effectiveness of U.S.
long-range precision-strike weapons.
Sadly there is far more need for Luttwak’s outstanding work today than when it
ªrst appeared in 1987. The spread of fundamentalism, terrorism, ethnic conºict,
weapons of mass destruction, and long-range ballistic missiles poses multiple chal-
lenges for U.S. ofªcials. After a decade of neglect, strategic thinking and
Clausewitzian strategists are rare in the Department of Defense. The time has arrived
for a return to strategy.
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